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PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: My name is Carl Felsenfeld. I
am a professor here at Fordham Law School.
We will now move into our next aspect of the program, which
is a panel. We will talk about the perspectives on the future
business planning and strategies for the future of Gramm-Leach-
Bliley' in practice.
I will assume that we all have a certain fundamental
knowledge of what Gramm-Leach-Bliley' is about. Congressman
Leach brought us into the fold, if we weren't there. Essentially, it
creates some coordination among banking law, insurance law, and
securities law.
We should not forget, along the way other kinds of institutions
and other kinds of financial activities that might pop up and be part
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Group, Inc.
.... Senior Vice President and Associate General Counsel, U.S. Trust Corporation
..... Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flor, LLP.
1. See, eg., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12
and 15 U.S.C.).
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of this mix. One is a little diffident about saying what they are. It
occurs to me, however, that we do have in the United States
entities such as finance companies, small-loan companies and other
types of financial institutions that, depending upon the shape of the
future, might turn out to be dominant players. I will introduce the
panelists as they come up.
Our first speaker is Ernie Patrikis. I have known Ernie
forever. In banking law circles in New York, he is one of the best-
known banking lawyers around. He had been General Counsel of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He ended his career at
the Federal Reserve Bank in 1998 as First Vice President, which is
the number two position at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. He went on from there to the American International
Group (AIG), which is one of the largest financial companies in
the world. He is now Senior Vice President and General Counsel
of the AIG holding company.
Ernie always has a somewhat different and original view on
what is going on. I am very interested in hearing what you have to
say this morning, Ernie.
MR. PATRIKIS: Thank you, Carl.
I thought I would start off by comparing the insurance and
banking industries a bit in terms of my perspective of the two
industries. I characterize them both as being subject to a high level
of competition. What that means is there are too many banks and
there are too many insurance companies. We now have,
approximately, 9,000 banks and 6,000 insurance companies in the
United States
What does that mean? It means there is too much capital
chasing too little good business. So in banking, it means the
spreads on loans are probably not adequate to cover the risk. In
insurance, it means the premiums charged in the general insurance
business are not adequate to cover the risk. Over the long term,
that means either failure or merger. That is nature's way. That is
very healthy.
There are two types of mergers when you do antitrust analysis,
or rather two types of ways of looking at mergers in antitrust
3. U.S. Census Bureau, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
NATIONAL DATA BOOK 520 (119th ed. 1999).
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analysis. One is geographic. That is, the area that the business is
in, in terms of looking for where the competition is. The other type
is in terms of the product market.
So I ask myself, "If a banking organization buys an insurance
company or an insurance organization buys a bank, is there
reduction in capacity?" If you accept my view that we have too
much capacity in banking and in insurance, we have not reduced it
at all. We probably do not have a whole lot of synergies. We do
not have many economies in terms of the back office. The world
will stay on its course, which means that if nature has its way we
will see either failures or more mergers down the road.
On the securities industry side, I think we do see something
unique. There are the "bulge bracket" firms, and it is very, very
hard to break into that group. Firms like J.P. Morgan are really
trying, and are perhaps almost there. We see a number of foreign
banks really retreating. Union Bank of Switzerland tried
retreating, it said, "Well, we can't really make it in New York. We
are going to focus on our business in London." I think in the
securities industry, while there are many smaller firms, in terms of
the major players, it is a fairly small group.
But in banking it has started when we have transactions like
Manufacturers Hanover coming into Chemical Bank' and Chase
Manhattan Bank coming into Chemical Bank, so that we now have
the "new" Chase. That takes capacity out when we have those
kinds of in-market mergers.
In the insurance industry, what we see is a little different.
Firms will exit lines of business. That does not happen in banking.
So an insurance company might bid on a whole line of business of
4. See J.P. Morgan's Uncertain Future, ECONOMIst, February 14, 1998, at 71
(characterizing "'bulge-bracket' [firms as] a small group of investment banks -
made up of Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
Discover - that earn much bigger profits than [other investment banks]").
5. See Michael Quint, Big Bank Merger to Join Chemical, Manufacturers,
N.Y. TmEs, July 16, 1991, at Al (reporting on the merger between Chemical
Bank and Manufacturers Hanover).
6. See Saul Hansell, Banking's New Giant: The Deal; Chase and Chemical
Agree to Merge in $10 Billion Deal Creating Largest U.S. Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29,1995, at Al (reporting on the merger between Chemical Banking Corporation
and Chase Manhattan Corporation).
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another firm that has just said that it cannot make it in that
business and that it will shut down that line. In banking, there are
mergers and acquisitions. Banking firms do not, however, typically
sell a whole line of business to their competitors.
Banks deliver their products pretty directly. Branch banking is
still the way to do business. The e-commerce banks or the dot-
commerce banks are not very successful. If they do succeed, it is
only by paying up on rates; however, that is not going to be
sufficient in the long run.
The tellers, for the most part, really are not a sophisticated
sales force. In insurance, however, there is a professional cadre
comprised of brokers and insurance agents, who substantially
outrank the tellers in sophistication.
We now see a change. I was on jury duty recently here in New
York, and there was a young woman on the jury employed by a
bank. She asked the judge to excuse her. He said, "Why? Your
employer is paying you." What the judge did not know, however,
is that she made a commission if she sold products across her
window. That is a change in commercial banking.
I look at the Internet and think it is not banking and insurance
nirvana - at least not yet. The reason why is that the products
being sold over the Internet are commodities. They are
commodity-like products. Take auto insurance for example. Let's
say your auto policy is a six-month policy. If you surf the Internet
regularly, you look for the lowest rate once every six months. The
only thing you look at is rate. Now, some will disagree with me
and try to say, "No, there are unique aspects to the policies. There
are all different parts to the policies that are very meaningful." I
don't believe that. Well, what does that mean? If someone keeps
moving on every six months, it means companies are going to have
trouble covering their fixed costs when they are dealing in a
commodity like auto insurance.
And then, there are other products, like annuities. These
products are sold; they are not bought. Someone surfing the
Internet is not going to buy an annuity. There has to be a
salesperson. There really needs to be a sales force, and that part of
it is different.
Investment banks are going through the same problem as
insurance companies regarding the impact of the Internet. I don't
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know if it was Allstate that said it would share with its agents some
of the income that was brought in by the Internet because of its
huge agent force.7 If you look at Merrill Lynch, it is experiencing
the same problem. What do you do with all your brokers when
you have the Internet? The struggles that must be going on within
Merrill Lynch in terms of this problem are fairly significant.
One of the supposedly motivating forces for the legislation8 is
the need for a level playing field. I just do not see it. A guarantee
and surety, a standby letter of credit, and a credit derivative, all
serve the same purpose. That does not mean that they should be
supervised or regulated in the same manner or treated the same
way. The reasons for this may be in terms of capital, tax,
accounting, the very nature of the risk (i.e., is it a short-term risk or
is it a long-term risk?) and so on.
Functional supervision, which is the usual description, just
doesn't do it for me. I don't know what it means. In the United
States, there was a view that if a bank did it, then someone should
regulate it - other than a bank - or supervise it - other than a bank
supervisor - or that it needed to be pushed out.
I liken this view to a situation that my predecessor, the First
Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, related
to me. His wife taught a very sophisticated math course to children
in elementary school. She was being evaluated. The evaluators
came around and told her she had to go back to teaching the other
way. She said, "Why?" They said, "Well, we can't measure you."
There is still some of that going on.
There are differences between supervision and regulation.
When one takes a look at the considerations involved, such as
regulations/rules, on/off, the percentage of capital versus the
percentage of surplus, it becomes clear that supervision is
qualitative. It is judgmental and it relies on an examining force.
Securities law has much more regulation to it. Banking has much
7. See Joseph B. Treaster, Allstate Poised to Sell Insurance Over Telephone
and Internet, N.Y. Times, November 11, 1999, at C6 (mentioning that
"Allstate... has... promis[ed] to pay local agents a commission of 2 percent to
3.5 percent for Internet and telephone sales of auto policies to customers in the
agents' territories").
8. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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more supervision to it. Insurance has everything to it.
If you do not know what insurance supervision and regulation
are like, here's a useful analogy. Let's say there's a lawyer at
Chase, and someone goes and talks to that lawyer and says, "Please
draft for us a consumer loan agreement that we can use in the fifty
states." The lawyer drafts the loan agreement. Someone then
takes that agreement plus the interest rate and files it with fifty
state bank supervisors. Each one then comes back with comments.
Sooner or later, that agreement will be approved by all fifty states.
That's insurance supervision and regulation, and not federal
regulation or federal supervision, but state supervision.
I ask myself the question, "Why would an insurance company
want to buy a commercial bank?" As I stated earlier, I don't think
either of these industries are going to give returns that people are
that happy with. Commercial banks bring with them commercial
lending and relationships. There was an article in The New York
Times maybe a month or two ago saying that Citigroup finally
found a synergy that they could brag about9, apparently one so
great that it was worthy of mention by The New York Times.
A lot of people say the synergies aren't there. John Reed"s
gave a talk at Standard & Poor's Financial Services Program three
weeks ago, where I believe he said that Citigroup has yet to prove
that these synergies are viable, or that Citigroup will really work."
We haven't seen it. I think there is a lot more talk and fantasy on
that issue than we have seen to date.
What is an insurance company? As I look at it, it consists of
two different things. On the one side are these liabilities -
insurance policies consisting of life, property and casualty. On the
other side is a huge investment machine. That's the part people
9. See Joseph Kahn, A New Financial Era: The Impact; Financial Services
Industry Faces a New World, N.Y. TIMEs, October 23, 1999, at C1 (noting that
"[Citigroup stated] that brokers working for Citigroup's Salomon Smith Barney
have sold $420 million in Citibank mortgages to their clients").
10. Former co-chairman and co-chief executive of Citigroup Inc.
11. See Dan Lonkevich, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK &
BENEFiTs MGMT., March 20, 2000, at 5 (quoting Mr. Reed, at Standard & Poor's
annual conference on Banks and Insurers, as saying "[wje're not sure [that our
profitability] is sustainable.... I think the jury is still out .... [IJt's not a
foregone conclusion [that the merger will work out well].").
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don't see. That investment machine then gets leverage, taking us
into the equivalent of private banking, hedge funds and non-
leveraged hedge funds. As far as that aspect of the business goes,
at AIG we do things like an India fund, or an Africa development
fund, or a Greenfield fund in the United States.
In dealing with entities, as Hank Greenberg'2 has reminded me
from time to time, you really have to work hard to kill an insurance
company. A bank can die rather quickly if it has incompetent
management, but an insurance company with incompetent
management can still survive thirty years into the future. That is
not great for competition because you are going to be under-priced
by a competitor who is going down, and that is not a happy state of
affairs.
I have just two more points I want to make. One of them is
that Gramm-Leach,.' first, is bank-centric. It is not a financial
services legislation, but is rather a bank-centric legislation. There
is not much in Gramm-Leach'4 about insurance, except to permit it.
Also, there's not much in there about the securities aspect.
There is one issue, however, I would like to address. It's called
source of strength. The bank holding company has a responsibility
to be a source of strength to its subsidiary bank. By legislation, it is
limited. What that means is that if the bank needs capital, there is
a limited responsibility for the holding company to inject capital
down to the bank.'
In this legislation,'6 the Federal Reserve is the overarching
supervisor - the umbrella supervisor. There was a fear that the
Federal Reserve would take money out of the insurance subsidiary
or the broker-dealer subsidiary and upstream it or downstream it
into the bank. The legislation says, "No, Federal Reserve, you
can't do that without the approval of the relevant supervisors.""
12. Maurice P,. Greenberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, American
International Group.
13. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
14. Id.
15. See id. § 121.
16. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fimancial Modernization Act, Pub. L No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
17. Id.
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This legislation is silent on the ability of the Federal Reserve to
take capital out of the bank, let's say, and downstream it into the
troubled insurance company, from the holding company on. Why?
Because it would never occur to a bank supervisor to take a penny
out.
Now, I ask myself the question, if the insurance company is in
trouble and insurance has guaranteed funds. These guaranteed
funds are a new concept; they are not as old as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). They came out of the trouble in
the 1980s and early 1990s. They are unfunded (though in New
York there is partial funding) insurance funds. So you can have
the head of [inaudible] going to see Federal Reserve Chairman
Greenspan and saying, "You have a bank that is well-capitalized.
That's why there's a financial holding company. Please take capital
out of the bank and upstream it or downstream it into the
insurance company."
Will that happen? I look at it another way and say that there
ought to be a source of strength requirement with respect to the
holding company and the bank. To me, this is a moral question. If
you take out dividends and you take tax benefits, you should have
to give when there is a need to give. If we truly are going to see
this as a financial services legislation, and not just a bank-centric
legislation, there should be a source of strength requirement.
The other aspect, the final one I want to raise, is that of a
federal charter.'8  I think we do need a federal charter. The
banking industry is going to apply a lot of pressure. If people like
myself - people coming from the banking side - go to insurance
and see these fifty state bank supervisors, it will be extremely
difficult to get products approved and rates changed. The resulting
frustration will lead one to say, "Let's deal with this another way."
I think it is going to be very, very difficult to see those
products that we call personal lines, i.e., life insurance, auto
18. See generally Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 [hereinafter Polking &
Cammarn]. See also Michael P. Molloy, Banking in the Twenty-First Century, 25
IOWA J. CORP. L. 787,793 (2000) (explaining that "[tjhe GLB generally endorses
the principle of functional regulation, positing that similar activities should be
regulated by the same regulator," therefore calling for multiple regulating bodies,
including both state and federal government charters).
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insurance and homeowners insurance, that type of insurance, go to
the federal level. Do we want a whole other federal regime dealing
with consumer issues?
States' rights, which was a dirty phrase when I was growing up,
is not a dirty phrase anymore. There are fifty state insurance
supervisors. That is fifty states where there are jobs and where
there is income. That is political power. It is not going to be easy
to change that.
In our view, the first step in the way it ought to be done - and
this, of course, suits us because it is the major thrust of our business
- is the general insurance business. It is the nationwide business
of selling to large corporations, not to individuals, and being able
to do that nationwide through a federal charter. Insurance has
form and rate regulations, so, as I said, the insurance form plus the
rate have to be filed. There is no need for that. The European
Union works without form and rate regulations. An insurance
company in one country can do business across borders, either
directly or through branches. No form and rate regulations are
required.
As for sales practice, we don't need it. To the extent that we
are dealing with sophisticated customers, they can protect
themselves. We don't need sales practice in any industry, including
the securities, futures, and banking industries, for there are
sophisticated parties in each. The government should not step in
to protect Procter & Gamble against Bankers Trust." Procter &
Gamble is a consenting adult.
So, I think the federal charter for insurance will help move us
in the direction of leveling the playing field, and I think we will
have some fun over the next year working on that.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Ernie.
You know, one of the deceptive aspects of having Ernie
Patrikis on a program is that, subject to the Boston accent, he
19. See generally Michael S. Bennett & Michael J. Main, The Casablanca
Paradigm: Regulatory Risk in the Asian Financial Derivative Markets, 5 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 2-4 (1999) (describing the losses suffered by Procter &
Gamble Co. due to an interest rate swap agreement with Bankers Trust
Company, and a subsequent lawsuit against Bankers Trust Company).
2001]
32 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
speaks in a fairly normal, ordinary, non-provocative way. I just
want to take a moment to indicate to you how unusually
provocative he can be when he is given the opportunity.
For example, he takes the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which is
an Act that the press says puts banking and insurance and
securities together, and describes it to us as essentially a banking
statute. I just sat here and heard that, and I'm not quite sure what
to derive from that. I do, however, want to think about it and see
where it gets me, Ernie.
In addition, I think he hit on the real problem of all of this -
"synergy." I hope we will be able to address it more closely as we
move on through the morning. Is there a synergy among banking,
insurance, and securities? Ernie says he is not sure he sees one.
The law is designed to create one.
How do we move ahead? How does this shake out? We have
a kind of controlled free-enterprise system in the United States,
and presumably, the best way will succeed. Again, what do we do
with this new opportunity? Our other speakers will have an
opportunity to address that and anything else they choose to
address.
Our next speaker is Frank Scifo. Frank is the Senior Vice
President and the Chief Compliance Officer of both the U.S. Trust
Corporation and the United States Trust Company. He has a rich
background in the banking industry. He joined U.S. Trust in 1992
and was its Acting General Counsel in 1998. He is Chairman of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's committee on
banking law and has served as Chairman of that committee's State
Legislation Committee.
It is with great pleasure, Frank, that I welcome you here. The
floor is yours.
MR. SCIFO: Thank you.
I will just start out with the usual disclaimer. My comments
here today do not reflect the opinions of my employers, U.S. Trust
Corporation and the Charles Schwab Corporation. Nor do they
reflect those of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
I was sitting here and I was thinking. I originally was a lawyer
20. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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in the New York State Banking Department's legal division.
Subsequent to that, I counseled Japanese banks from a private
firm. Since then, I have been general counsel or senior counsel in a
number of different types of institutions, from a community-sized
savings bank to Citigroup, or Citibank at the time, to U.S. Trust
presently. So I look at Gramm-Leach-Blileyu and the things that it
does more particularly from an insider's point of view. When I say
"insider," I don't mean the Beltway; I mean inside the bank and
looking at the dynamics that I know go on and seeing how the
legislation affects banking. So essentially, my comments are
probably bank-centric.
As I go along, I may not sufficiently qualify everything that I
say. That is not intended to diminish in any way the complexity of
the influences that need to be balanced in both putting together
legislation and creating the regulations to support that legislation.
The good faith of all the parties in the fray is presumed. But,
nonetheless, one needs to have a point of view, especially when
representing one's client.
That having been said, when I look at the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act' in its totality, what does it do? From the bank
regulation point of view, it expedites things. Banks are allowed to
get into a lot of different things on a more rapid basis. Notices can
be provided after the fact, rather than having to go through an
application processO The range of activities is clearly broader.
There are a number of options in how to approach performing
the same activity. Particularly, a subsidiary of a national bank
could perform something that is very close to what a subsidiary of a
financial holding company can do. There may, however, be some
arbitrage differences in how the regulators go about things. The
other thing that comes to mind is that there are a number of
different activities which have yet to be broached that may be
21. Id.
22. 1&
23. See id. at § 103; see also Polking and Cammarn, supra note 18, at 7 (noting
that "[uinder the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, if the proposed new activity is
'financial in nature'... a finanical holding company must simply provide 30 days'
after-the-fact notice to the Federal Reserve Board of the new activities or
acquisition").
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plausible under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ' if the regulatory
agencies that have the interpretative authority are so inclined. So
essentially, there is the new circumstance.
What is the new challenge? I think one of the challenges is for
bank management not to get confused by the broad array of
choices that they have at the present time. This bill really, as
Chairman Leach said earlier, follows the evolution of the banking
industry rather than prescribes how it will proceed. Therefore, in
that vein, it is an evolutionary instrument rather than a
revolutionary instrument. If viewed in that fashion, management
can stay on focus in looking at what it does best and what it would
like to do better.
When putting together products, programs and new ventures
within a financial institution, timing is always important. You have
a mix. The business imperative to do things quickly and profitably
always runs into the regulatory construct that it must confront. So
you end up now with things that are becoming somewhat more
clear.
Basically, management wants to do X. The questions initially
are: "Is it financial in nature? Is it incidental to a financial activity?
Is it complementary to financial activities? What process is
entailed in securing an opinion as to either of these three effects?"
At the moment, securing such an opinion is a lengthy process.
The regulators have a lot of regulations and interpretations that
they need to produce in a short period of time. Talking to people
over the phone about this or that may not be possible. Essentially,
a rapid report on the lay of the land is much more difficult these
days. This is especially true when a client is looking to immediately
venture into financial holding company activities on a broad basis.
I think an important concern, having worked with state bank
regulators - and I think every federal bank regulator at this point
in time - is clearly what is the Federal Reserve's disposition with
respect to each of these subjects. Will it grow to be progressive or
will it continue to be conservative in nature? Will it be too risk-
24. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
25. See James A. Leach, Keynote Address, 6 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 9 -
10 (2001).
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averse and process-oriented in its approach? Will it be a
restraining influence when other agencies with comparable
authority look to be more progressive than the Federal Reserve
would otherAse choose to be? All of these things are very
confusing to the management of a financial institution, who simply
want to know when they can execute something and how quickly.
It makes it a little bit more difficult for bank counsel to provide
expedient and accurate advice.
I think the privacy and merchant banking regulations are
somewhat illuminating. A regulatory system that is more receptive
to market discipline may not be here yet and we may still be
looking at artificial regulatory restraints that business models show
can be more successful. Those business models, however, are not
well received by the bank regulators and are reshaped by
regulation that may prove to be disabling, in some measure, to the
affected institutions' ability to compete.
Essentially, when you look at the merchant banking provisions
in the Act, there is a two-to-five-year omership limit for a
merchant banking investment. " There are limits on the ability to
manage or operate the companies in which the investments are
made.7 Primarily, one can only do so when necessary or required
to obtain a reasonable return on investment. That has generally
been thought to mean that the investment has to be experiencing
difficulty. Now, this is typically a bank regulatory process. When
the investment is in trouble, the bank has greater powers. Before it
is in trouble, however, the bank is not able to fully involve itself. I
query whether that is a proper model to continue with into the
future. There are also recent merchant banking regulations
proposing a disconcerting haircut with respect to capital adequacy
and capital maintenance.' On this level playing field, repeated
26. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a).
27. See id. ("A bank holding company [cannot] routinely manage or operate
such company or entity[,1 except as may be necessary or required to obtain a
reasonable return on investment upon resale or disposition.").
28. See Joseph J. Norton and Christopher D. Olive, A By-Product of the
Globalization Process: the Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions -
the U.S. Regulatory Framework, 56 BUS. LAW. 591 n.143, February 20DI ("The
[Federal Reserve Board] has adopted an interim rule implementing the merchant
banking authority, proposed regulations to impose special capital requirements
20011
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interventions of artificial bank regulatory concepts into businesses
which are not bank regulatory at the outset will result in financial
institutions or financial holding companies choosing not to get into
certain activities that they would otherwise pursue.
There are also certain bank regulatory concepts that end up
being counterintuitive and therefore difficult for business people to
understand. One instance is in the privacy proposal.' There is
certain text within the proposal which leads one to believe that
acquiring from the customer some readily available information,
such as the kind you could get from a phonebook, renders the
information non-public.' I would suggest that these types of
counterintuitive rules are going to be very tough to sell to systems
people and bank management, especially when they need to
successfully comply with them in order to avoid liability under the
Act.3
1
I think, when you view Gramm-Leach-Bliley' in its totality,
not much has changed in many ways. Management culture will be
put to the test, as it has always been. Does it have traditionally
well-developed business plans and visions? Does it usually plan
well? Does it cover details as well as it covers big issues? Does it
investigate things thoroughly?
The Act33 makes things easier procedurally. I would submit,
however, that success still depends essentially on the quality and
the character of the management within the institution and their
patience in making sure that things are done well rather than just
quickly. One of the other things that I tended to get involved with
during my banking career was dealing with a lot of regulatory
employees. This can be both a blessing and, sometimes, a
difficulty. As the statute now stands, a bank is going to be
regulated by federal bank regulators. In addition, a bank will be
subject to regulation by some state bank regulators depending
for such activities, and issued supervisory guidance for such activities.").
29. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act §§ 521-
27.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
33. Id.
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upon the bank's affiliate structure. Moreover, there is the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Self-
Regulatory Organizations. Finally, there are state administrators
and state insurance departments. Each of the components of a
financial holding company will come from a different discipline.
Some vill know how to deal with one type of regulator but not
with the others.
As some of you may know, when you are dealing with an
examining authority, one of the key things is being able to explain
what your institution does. Your organization may do its job well,
but if you cannot explain your function succinctly and correctly to a
bank or another regulator the first time out, the quality of the
regulatory engagement tends to degrade. There is a general
perception towards bank regulators. Bank regulators tend to issue
somewhat specific written authorities with relative procedural
freedom. The focus is always on institutional safety and soundness,
and the goal is to protect the public confidence in a particular bank
and in banks in general. The regulation follows market behavior, it
does not precede it. Bank regulators are comparatively slow to
discipline their regulatees.
With securities regulators, the authorities tend to be more
specific and less procedural freedom is involved. The focus is on
consumer protection and public confidence in the markets. The
overseers are comparatively quick to discipline. I was just recently
at a meeting where some SEC officers were speaking, and really,
the SEC is not reluctant about putting an institution out of business
if SEC feels such action is warranted. Whereas, in a bank
regulatory environment, that is the absolute last thing that you
want to do.
There are state-by-state peculiarities regarding insurance
regulators, about whom I admittedly know much less about than
banking and securities regulators. The focus of insurance
regulators is on the state market and it appears to involve a
balancing of the ability of the insurers to ext the market or to
withdraw a product, instead of the consumer fairness need and
affordability issues. My understanding there, as well, is that the
agencies are comparatively slow to discipline.
So what is the challenge that is faced by those trying to
coordinate this multi-faceted regulatory relationship? I think there
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needs to be management that is familiar with one personality and
familiar enough with the others to be able to adapt and deal with
them well. In-house staff are typically very candid with bank
regulators. They disclose everything and they discuss it as long as
the regulators desire. With securities regulators - having gone
through a couple of those myself - one tends to be circumspect;
giving only the information that is asked for. The goal of the
engagement is not to have the examiner leave feeling prideful
about your institution, but to simply stay away from the
enforcement proceedings that might result.
With the insurance regulators, as Mr. Patrikis was saying
before, ' there seems to be a constant conversation taking place,
concerning both products and examinations. In my view, this
general dialogue seems to be less troublesome than bank
employees dealing with securities regulators.
The emerging question really is how financial holding
companies and bank holding companies deal with and manage
these relationships all at the same time. Clearly, each of these
agencies is going to want information in formats and in particular
aspects to their liking. The systems will have to generate reports
that are similar in nature, but different because each of the
regulators will have their own peculiarities. There will be an initial
level of frustration when each of these regulators comes into a shop
and the information is not ready.
So, it seems to me that, as a financial institution moves from
one business to the other, there will be a significant amount of
work necessary to make sure that the institution is ready to manage
that relationship well. There are some resources that need to be
committed that otherwise wouldn't have been budgeted for.
The next thing I would like to talk about is the risk of being a
financial holding company. The downside of the statute and the
certification as a financial holding company is that once the
institution is certified, it had better stay that way. It needs to be
well capitalized and well managed.' The institution's CRA"6
34. See supra pp. 24-31.
35. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a)
(stating that to engage in certain activities a bank holding company's depository
institution subsidiaries must be well capitalized and well managed).
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ratings need to be satisfactory in each of the insured depository
institutions that are part of the affiliate family 7
This is the first time that there is actual statutory and
enforcement reliance on CRA ratings and bank management
ratings within the regulatory scheme designed for commercial
banks.3 What happens if an institution falls out of the profile of a
financial holding company? It gets frozen in place with respect to
activities.
That is probably a move backwards. There are no new
powers. Again, if it is standing still, it is suffering financially
because its capital is already invested in doing that which it is now
limited in doing. If things get bad enough, the institution may face
a divestiture of the insured depository institutions. Separate from
that, it has the potential for having to make public disclosures in its
securities filings, with respect to degradation in any of the suffering
areas. That, in and of itself, can have capital adequacy
repercussions and other degrading results.
So what challenge is presented here? The task, and a difficult
one at that, is for a financial institution or a company to be honest
in appraising itself. I think it needs to look at lines of business, the
36. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (200). See
generally Mviho Kubota, Note, Encouraging Community Development in
Cyberspace Applying The Community Reinvestment Act to Internet Banks, 5
B.U. J. SCL & TECH. L. S, 8 (1999) (stating that "Congress enacted the
Community Reinvestment Act ... to encourage banks to serve the credit needs of
their entire communities, including low- and moderate-income individuals and
areas").
37. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a)
(stating that a financial holding company may not engage in certain activities:
if any insured depository institution subsidiary of such financial holding
company, or the insured depository institution or any of its insured depository
institution affiliates, has received in its most recent examination under the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, a rating of less than "satisfactory record
of meeting community credit needs").
38. See Adam Nguyen and Matt Watkins, RECENT LEGISLATION:
Fmancial Services Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 583 (2000) (noting that
"the bank holding company must pass minimum Community Reinvestment Act
("CRA") requirements, although the Act does not grant the Fed any remedial
powers, such as requiring dissolution of a holding company because of a poor
CRA rating").
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resources that are dedicated to the various activities in which it is
engaged, and whether, in fact, it is knowledgeable about its
customers. This opinion is not based on a Bank Secrecy Act" point
of view, but on the product delivery/product acceptability
standpoint.
Also, what is its perception of the markets? Is the perception
accurate? For instance, is there a high degree of success with
product delivery methods via the Internet to high-net-worth
customers that are used to meeting with an account representative?
Or is that something that is more of a pilot project? If so, should
resources commensurate with that level of engagement be
committed?
Are the incremental benefits of being a financial holding
company worth the inherent risks? There are many things that an
institution will be able to do as a bank holding company. There
are, I think, 150-some-odd financial holding companies that have
been approved or certified at this point in time °. Clearly, when we
look at the list of the first 117 that came out day one, it ran all over
the lot. Some institutions were simply certifying so that they could
get rid of the office and the "Community of 5,000,"' to be able to
sell insurance agency services in small regional banks or
community banks. Others, of course, include Citigroup, Chase and
the like, and have robust business plans and multi-faceted areas of
business.
I think there is clearly room for being a successful financial
39. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114 (1970) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-
5330). See generally Sandra L. Gramman et al., Financial Institutions Fraud, 37
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 551, 576 (2000) (showing that "Congress enacted... the
Bank Secrecy Act... out of concern that financial institutions increasingly were
being used to launder unreported income and obtain funds illegally").
40. See Rob Garver, Fed Rebuts Foreign Banks' Claim on New Rules' Bias,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 19, 2000 at 2 (noting that through April, 2000 "155 financial
holding companies [had] been formed").
41. "For many years, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
has interpreted [12 U.S.C. §92J [as] permitting any bank office located in a place
not exceeding 5,000 persons to act as a general insurance agent, even though the
bank's principal office is located in a community exceeding 5,000." See Barry A.
Abbott, et. al, Survey: Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus. LAW 1005,1015-
16 (1988).
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institution, either from a bank holding company model or a
financial holding company model. If one, however, goes the
financial holding company route, because of the draconian results
from not complying with the affiliate depository institutions, is
clear that it is absolutely necessary to reduce the number of insured
depository institutions that are in an affiliate group. This vill
enhance the simplicity with which the compliance and control risks
can be managed. If management degrades it, this will bring dowm
the management's rating. A downgraded management rating
could well be a very difficult thing to reclaim in a very quick way.
The other thing that counterbalances this reduction of number of
affiliates within a group is the need to maintain some ability to
sustain regulatory arbitrage. This is so that options remain open to
the institution that should be prudently maintained.
When I look at the spread of bank-type regulation to other
industries through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,' I become
concerned about the potential for the spread of increased
regulatory burdens, rather than a level playing field where people
do businesses in non-banking areas or industries as they always
have been done. There are more regulators and more diverse
requirements. Each regulator, as I said before, will want
information in the way and mode it is used to receiving it.
There is a desire, from the regulators' point of view, to
simplify things by having "one-size" policies fit all affiliates. Yet
we are talking about distinct and very different businesses. I am
not quite sure how well this policy works, but it is clearly one of the
demands that is being made on financial holding companies at this
point. In addition, there is a push-out of broker-dealer and fund
advisor activities mandated by the statute That will, in and of
itself, create some inherent operational and compliance issues that
were not there before.
42. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
43. See generally Polking & Cammarn, supra note 18, at 16 (stating that
because under Gramm-Leach-Billey's functional regulation provisions "it is
impracticable in many cases for a bank itself to register as a broker-dealer, many
of the securities activities traditionally conducted by banks... must ba 'pushed
out' into an affiliated securities firm that is othenise registered as a broker-
dealer").
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There is also a heavy reliance on risk-managed-based review
of the activities of a financial holding company. In this instance,
one of the issues is who is basing the risk. The management, in its
experience of how its companies operate, may have one view of
what the inherent-in-any-particular-activity level of risk is, while
the regulators may have a different view. But there is a heavy
reliance on risk management; to me that is just the gloss on it. The
real nuts and bolts about how much risk is allocated to a particular
activity is where the real digging goes on.
The other thing about this "one size fits all" issue is that, with
a financial holding company that is complex and involved in
diverse activities and industries, there ends up being a request to
upstream these types of controls from the insured depository
institutions and the securities firms up to the holding company.
That begs for symmetry and simplicity, but I am not quite sure that
these are attainable. It may well be the case that an institution
simply has to, at the holding company level, have a greater faith in
the ability of the functional regulator to come to proper judgments
on how the different affiliates are performing.
I also worry about the creep of what I call government
instrumentality-type regulations, from financial institutions (the
financial institutions have been laboring under certain of these
requirements for years) to other types of affiliates. However, the
affiliates' competitors that are not part of a financial holding
company are not similarly burdened. Examples of this are the
"know your customer" requirements that are now being impressed
by examination only," but were part of a proposed regulation' that
was soundly handed back to the government with a "no, thank
you". Suspicious activity reporting, which in itself is a dilemma
causing people to make law enforcement judgments basically in a
commercial environment, is very difficult and very risky for a
private enterprise.
44. See Currency & Foreign Transactions Report Act 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5329
(2000). See generally Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, The Electronic Future
of Cash: How Best to Guide the Evolution of Electronic Currency Law, 46 AM. U.
L. REv. 1105, 1123 (1997).
45. Currency & Foreign Transactions Report Act 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5329
(2000).
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The privacy requirements, which are in Title 5 of the
legislation, are only applied to new financial companies!' The
definition, as Chairman Leach said before,' of what a financial
activity is may grow over time. I would imagine, however, that as
that growth occurs there will be increasing resistance, by the
businesses that are being drawn into the privacy compliance arena,
to limit the growth of things that are financial in nature by
definition. This is simply so they will not have to deal with these
types of requirements.
The other thing with respect to regulation itself, at least from
my point of view, is that there is an increasing incidence of
regulation by guidance by bank regulators. Rather than looking to
a regulation for guidance, an institution gets a statement or a
notice which, in lieu of regulations, acts as guidance. The
examiners incorporate it into their manual, and it is as if there was
discourse between the industry and regulators and this is the result.
But, in fact, that disclosure has been bypassed.
The subjects that are being addressed now are fiduciary
activities; this is a very difficult topic to not have a lot of discussion
on. Clearly, fiduciary activities are risky. They have, however,
been going on and have been successfully managed, both from a
regulatory point of view and a business point of view, for a very
long time. These kinds of guidance without regulatee input, to me,
are somewhat unfortunate, and hopefully we will get back to the
promulgated regulation mode more frequently.
There is a potential for regulatory relief in all of this,
notwithstanding what I have just said. You now have three
industries - only one of which is used to dealing with the financial
institution regulators - and they tend to be a conservative lot. My
thought is that, as they get a better flavor of the type of regulation
that they have acquired by becoming part of a financial holding
company, there may be a better balance in the discourse and a
better balance in the result with respect to the regulatory burdens
that are put upon financial holding company affiliates in the near
46. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act §§ 501-
527.
47. See James A. Leach, Keynote Address, 6 FORDHAM J. CoRp. & FIN. L. 9,
14-15 (2001).
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future.
I think that, at the end of the day, there are two things that
have to be done. First, there must be an enlightened management
approach to all of these issues - one that is not afraid of complexity,
one that is not afraid of discussion that goes on for more than five
minutes on any subject. There must also be an agile computer
system to support a bank because it is very difficult to anticipate
how that system will need to perform in the future.
The privacy regulations of the legislation are a case in point.'
There is the federal level, where affiliate exchanges are acceptable,
but an institution needs to be able to implement opt-out with
respect to third-party sharings." There is also the Fair Credit
Reporting Act," which makes necessary the ability to implement
an opt-out between affiliates. 1
Then, there is the state "wild card," if you will, where the Act'
invites states to become even more restrictive on the ability to
exchange information? What does that do? It means there is a
need for systems where multiple switches can be turned on and off.
If a compliant state, whatever state it may be, is an opt-in state, an
institution needs to be able to run an opt-in in that state while it is
running opt-outs everywhere else.
That gets down to a very fine stroke in a control environment
and in the data processing and how many switches are available to
control the aggregate product of that system. It means that there is
a need to put regulatory thought into systems enterprises very
early on, probably at an unprecedented level.
With that, I will close.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Frank. You gave
48. See Granun-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act §§ 501-
527.
49. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 502(b).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681(u) (2000).
51. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 508(a).
52. Granmm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
53. See id. § 507(a) (stating that "a State statute, regulation, order, or
interpretation is not inconsistent with the provision of this subtitle if the
protection such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords any person is
greater than the protection provided under [federal law]").
SYMPOSIUM
us a lot to think about.
I will just mention the issue of synergy that I talked about
before, which Ernie raised.-- You will note it was a dominant
ingredient of Frank's talk, but he approached it from a different
point of view; that is, the synergy in the regulatory process. Is it
appropriate to have securities regulation and banking regulation
and insurance regulation come from essentially the same point, or
do they have different points of view that require different
regulatory attitudes? It is a very interesting question that those in
the trenches will have to consider and pursue, in the time we spend
under Gramm-Leach-Bliley. '
Our next speaker is William J. Sweet, Jr. Bill is a partner in
the Washington D.C. office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, &
Flom. Before he joined Skadden Arps, Bill was an attorney with
the Federal Reserve System, so he learned his banking from the
ground up and now applies it. He does a great deal of
international banking. He also works on mergers and acquisitions,
including the recent Citigroup merger. ' He has a strong
background in representing foreign banks. This leads me to bring
a new ingredient into this discussion, which is the effect of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley'3 upon the foreign banking community. Today, some
mere three weeks after the effective date of Gramm-Leach-Bliley,9
we see what may be a severe dislocation in the relation of
American banks and foreign banks. As you may know, to take
advantage of the statute, in general, you have to be a financial
holding company;o this requires an application to the Federal
54. See supra p. 34.
55. See supra pp. 25,28.
56. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
57. See Timothy L. O'Brien & Joseph B. Treaster, Shaping a Colossus: The
Overview; In Largest Deal Ever, Citicorp Plans Merger with Travelers Group,
N.Y. Tumes, Apr. 7, 1998, at Al (reporting on the merger betwveen Citicorp and
Travelers Group Inc.).
58. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
59. See id § 161 (setting forth that all provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, except section 104, vill become effective 120 days after enactment).
60. See Gramnn-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a).
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Reserve. Of the 160-something...
MR. SWEET: I think there are about 150 now. 1
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Of the 160 financial holding
companies, I think only seven are foreign and the rest are
American.' Most of the foreign applications have been rejected,
largely for reasons of capital, I am told.'
Does this mean we are leaving foreign banks behind? Are we
creating a kind of domestic favoritism in the banking system? It is,
of course, much too soon to know. I think, however, it is
something that we should take note of and evaluate.
I am pleased to see we have in our audience this morning
Larry Uhlick, the Executive Director and General Counsel of the
Institute of International Bankers for the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago. This is the organization that represents foreign banks in
the United States. Maybe, Larry, you can give us your thoughts
before the morning wears out on whether we are prejudicing
foreign banks under Gramm-Leach-Bliley. ' It is an issue I never
thought about until I started to see these figures.
I haven't forgotten you, Bill. You are our next speaker and I
look forward to hearing from you. Thank you.
MR. SWEET: Thank you very much.
The foreign banking subject is an important one. Over the last
two decades, the federal government has basically decreased
61. See Garver, supra note 40.
62. See id. (stating that of the financial holding companies that had been
formed through April, 2000, 13 were formed by foreign banks).
63. See, e.g., EU Urges Equal Treatment Under New US Banking Laws, PR
NEwswIRE, Mar. 6, 2000 [hereinafter PR NEwswIRE] (quoting John B.
Richardson, Deputy Chief of Mission at the European Commission's Washington
delegation as saying:
[an area] of concern [with Gramm-Leach-Bliley regards the well-capitalized
standards for foreign banks. US bank holding companies qualify if their US bank
subsidiaries meet the well-capitalized numerical criteria on a risk and leverage
basis. In the case of foreign banks, the test is more complicated. It is somewhat
troubling that the US authorities require foreign banks on a global basis to satisfy
risk-based capital requirements that exceed the internationally agreed upon risk-
based standards in the Basle Accord.
64. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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foreign banks access to the U.S. financial system - to the long-
term detriment of the system, in my opinion. That is, however, a
subject for another day.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley" is something I approach with a great
deal of humility and nostalgia. I approach it with humility because,
as Chairman Leach mentioned beforel' the Act itself is several
hundred pages long. If you look at Tab B in the "telephone book"
that you received, most of that book represents regulations that
have come out to date. Much more, by far, of the regulations are
still ahead of us. Also, I have to confess, as an active practitioner
advising firms in all industries, I have yet to read all of this. What
we got so far is, nevertheless, remarkable.
Also, I have to speak to the nostalgia. When Congress dealt
vAth this subject the last time, in 1933," they managed to tear
asunder the banking and securities industries with about two pages
of text. It was far simpler to understand that than what we have
got to deal vth today. Nonetheless, it is remarkable legislation!'
It would have been more remarkable had it been enacted ten years
ago. It has been under consideration over the last t-wo decades:'
In the interim, banks, securities firms, and insurance
65. See generally H. Rodgin Cohen, Landmark Legislation Passes; Examining
Impact on Financial Services Global Consolidation, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 15, 1999, at
S3, (stating that the "[Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] ... removes restrictions no,
imposed on banks under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) ... The BHCA restrictions generally apply to
foreign banks that conduct U.S. operations through a branch or agency.").
66. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
67. See James A. Leach, Keynote Address, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. & L 9
(2001).
68. See Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66,4S Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (also known as the Banking Act of 1933).
69. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
70. See Nguyen and Watkins, supra note 33, at 579 (noting that "after twenty
years of effort by industry lobbyists and lawmakers, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act was signed into law"); Poling & Cammarn, supra
note 18, at 1 (noting that the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act "represents
the culmination of Congressional financial reform efforts spanning more than 30
years").
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companies have really learned how to offer a full package of
financial services - be they retail or commercial - to their
customers without being affiliated, by and large, with their sister
organizations. Therefore, while this legislation71 takes some
important steps in structural reform, such as allowing banks and
insurance firms to affiliate.' these changes are going to be regarded
as more of a marginal improvement by an industry. Moreover, that
industry is already competing with products and services from all
of their affiliated and non-affiliated organizations.
Against this marginal advantage, organizations are going to
have to think about the costs associated with the ownership of a
bank. Those costs, I think, are significant and real. I am going to
review them as one of the three topics I will talk about. As a result
of those costs, securities and insurance firms, and even those
banking firms that are already bank holding companies, have to
give very serious thought to whether they want to become a
financial holding company. The foreign banking organizations, by
and large, will be not be able to become financial holding
companies because of capital rules that are unique to the United
States."3
Those organizations that are not currently financial holding
companies are going to give serious consideration to alternatives
that continue to exist in the current scheme. If they become
financial holding companies, they are going to do so only if they
have a strategic objective for which there is no other alternative
besides becoming a financial holding company. Such an example is
the Charles Schwab/U.S. Trust transaction' - the acquisition of an
investment management firm by a securities firm. It just so
happened that the investment management firm was, in fact,
chartered as a bank.
The three things I would like to talk about are the costs of
becoming a financial holding company, the alternatives, and then,
71. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
72. Id §§ 101-103.
73. See Garver, supra note 62 and PR NEwsWIRE, supra note 63.
74. See Schwab Wins Approval to Buy U.S. Trust, N.Y. TIMpsS, May 2, 2000,
at C14 (reporting on the Federal Reserve's approval of Charles Schwab
Corporation's acquisition of U.S. Trust Corporation).
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briefly, the Internet. I know we have limited time, so feel free to
let me know if I am running too long.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: We have a lot of time.
MR. SWEET: All right.
The financial holding company costs are four-fold. The first is
the complexity of the regulations and the statute itself. Second,
beyond complexity, there is increased regulatory leverage over
private companies, which has been introduced by the legislation.
Third, there is decreased flexibility with respect to non-banking
activities, especially for those firms that are not currently in the
banking industry. Fourth, there are capital costs that we have yet
to fully see.
Regarding the complexity of the statute and its regulations, I
know other reasonably sophisticated practitioners who get
Gramm-Leach-BlileyS questions wrong all the time. It is going to
take a long time before we really understand what all of this
means, and actually can give meaning to the interaction of these
statutes and regulations. It wiAll be much more complex for
management, which has to actually plan ahead two or three or five
years for the organization, to understand the ramifications of this
statute and to deal with them effectively.
The second cost, increased leverage by regulators over
banking affiliates, results from many factors. In order to be a
financial holding company, you have to have banks that are well
capitalized, rated by examiners as well managed:' In addition, you
must also be rated, for Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) '
purposes, as satisfactory or better.7
The downside to being a financial holding company is, as
Frank Scifo pointed out,7 the fact that an institution can be
decertified as a financial holding company. If that happens, it can
no longer conduct its activities and must divest to its affiliates. It
means big trouble, particularly with respect to the managerial
75. Gramm-Leach-Blley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
76. See id. at § 103(a).
77. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2000).
78. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a).
79. See supra pp. 38-39.
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rating and the CRA rating. Those ratings are provided through
exams that are not subject to what I would call objective criteria,
but rather subjective judgments as to the conduct of management
and their ability to satisfy the community's needs. There will be a
huge increase in the leverage of an examiner who walks in and
says, "I don't think you've been doing that CRA activity quite
right" or "I don't think your risk management system is quite up to
par." Previously, those debates went on all the time. A banking
organization was able to sit down and discuss it with the regulators,
disagree and take the issue to a higher authority. If the
disagreement persisted, then the bank would continue its life
without coming to an agreement. In the future, that will not be the
case. Banking organizations will be far more constrained by the
views of their examiners than they ever were in the past.
Third, there is also the issue of decreased flexibility in the
conduct of non-banking businesses. This will be less an issue for
current banking organizations that have found their activities, and
the affiliates they can own, to be broadened. It is more of an issue
for securities and insurance firms, investment managers and other
entrepreneurs, which might want to affiliate with a bank and are
currently accustomed to no limits on their businesses, or at least on
those businesses outside of their regulated affiliates. An insurance
company conducting its swaps activities is not regulated, and there
is no limit on what swaps can be executed. If you are doing
merchant banking outside of your securities affiliate, no one is
telling you how long you can hold the investment or what you can
do.
The merchant banking authority, in particular, is an example
of a situation where the costs, I think, have been significantly
increased over those contemplated in the statute.' Basically, the
statute provided that an entity could conduct investment merchant
banking in a manner that was designed to ensure that it did not
engage in commerce. 1 Essentially, it required that you would
eventually divest the company. You could not control that
company on a day-to-day basis, even though you could own all of
80. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act §§
103(a), 122.
81. See id. § 103(a).
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its stock and control its board.'
The Federal Reserve has chosen to promulgate a very detailed
set of regulations, that thoroughly regulate this business and
impose capital requirements. The Fed acted so for reasons
peculiar to its culture - out of fear about what may happen if the
economy falls off the cliff and every bank makes a merchant
banking investment. They have claimed, in good faith in my
opinion, to impose regulations on the basis of a model that they
have researched with the industry.
I think that what the Federal Reserve misses is that the
financial services industry is a lot larger than New York. It's very
diverse. The sorts of merchant banking investments that will be
made by this diversity of organizations would be far too
heterogeneous to define.
Secondly, even if an industry exists within the New York
capital markets business, it is one thing to operate under this
model; it is another thing to operate within the particular limits of a
rule. It is much more difficult to raise capital when you have to tell
investors "I have to be out of this investment in ten years. Even if
it is not doing well or it is on the upswing, I absolutely have to be
out of it." One is also at least uncertain that you would be able to
hold onto the investment, because regulators have the discretion,
basically, to tell you to unload it at that point.
The capital costs exist at several levels. There is going to be a
decreased flexibility with respect to allocation of capital at the
bank level. Previously, banks were heavily regulated from a capital
standpoint. If they had more capital, they could do more things; if
they had less capital, they could do fewer things. It was, however,
still their choice. Essentially, banks could operate at a less-than-
well-capitalized level and do quite well - allocate capital to other
affiliates and return capital to shareholders. Under the financial
holding company system, if any of an entity's banks drops below
"well-capitalized," the entity would lose all of its authority as a
financial holding company' - again with disastrous consequences.
There have been capital requirements imposed for merchant
banking. This is something that the private sector does with its
82. See id.
83. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a).
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own judgment, over a range of capital levels. There is now,
however, an established government-mandated capital level that
will reduce the management of capital within holding companies.
Finally - and we have yet to see this - the statute gives the
Federal Reserve very specific authority to regulate capital at the
parent level.' This is something it does for bank holding
companies today, but not for a securities firm or an insurance firm
at the parent level. The only entities that are regulated from a
capital standpoint in non-bank holding companies are the
regulated entities, the insurance companies and the securities
firms.
We do not quite know what those future regulations are going
to say. The rule makers could not mess around with the capital
requirements of subsidiaries; they could simply establish
consolidated rules. Through the magic of accounting, however, all
capital at subsidiaries tends to roll up to the parent. So how all of
this will be resolved remains to be seen. I think there is a real
question as to whether the regulators have acted inconsistently
with the (merchant banking) capital requirements directive. If
merchant banking is concerned in an affiliate that is regulated, for
example, by the SEC, then the Federal Reserve has, essentially,
independently imposed new capital requirements. It will be sure to
say that the activity is at the parent level.
There are alternatives to the financial holding company.
People will give these alternatives very serious consideration.
Certainly, prior to this legislation" many insurance firms (including
the AIG) and securities firms established thrifts, which required no
regulation at the federal level. Regulation was entirely at the bank
level - at the thrift level. That continues to be an option.
As Chairman Leach indicated,' this is no longer an option for
commercial firms. They cannot acquire thrifts because the
businesses of a parent must be limited to financial services
84. See id.
85. Gramin-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
86. See James A. Leach, Keynote Address, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9,
15 (2001).
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businessesY But for a Charles Schwab or an AIG, the businesses
they conduct, by and large, are consistent with those allowed for
financial holding companies. They are the model for these thrift
holding companies, 3 with the understanding that these companies
don't become financial holding companies. They are subject
neither to Federal Reserve nor capital regulation. They are not
subject to the oversight of anyone; they must merely limit their
activities. So that is a real alternative and it will continue to be an
alternative. People will look to credit card banks, non-bank trust
companies, and other alternatives to provide financial services.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: I really had trouble getting up
because I found myself thinking so hard about what you were
saying. I would have preferred to sit and muse over it a little
longer, but we must move ahead.
Our next speaker is William Lifland!' I think I have known
him about as long as I have knovm Ernie Patrikis, which is to say
forever. I can't remember when it started. Bill is a partner at
Cahill Gordon & Reindel, and is one of the leaders in the United
States in the field of antitrust law. Incidentally, we are very proud
to have him as an adjunct professor here at Fordham. Bill
graduated from Yale College and then went to the Harvard Law
School, where he was President of the Law Review. He has been
on top of the legal world ever since. We are very happy to have
you here, Bill.
MR. LIFLAND: Thank you very much, Professor Felsenfeld,
for that very nice introduction. Thank you also for inviting me to
this program. I have learned a lot from the other panelists this
87. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 401(a);
see also Polling & Cammarn, supra note 18, at 27 (arguing that Gramm-Leach-
Bliley "significantly diminishes the value of the thrift charter to commercial firms
that had previously considered chartering or acquiring a thrift to obtain certain
powers conferred on financial institutions... without becoming subject to bank
or thrift holding company acting restrictions").
88. See generally Susan Sirota Gaetano, Note, An Overview of Financial
Services Reform 1988, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 793, 811 (1999) (noting that "a unitary
thrift is a company that controls a single savings association and [prior to
Gramm-Leach-Bliley] allow[ed] unitary thrift holding company parents to
engage freely in business activities, including commerce and finance").
89. Mr. Lifland is a Partner at Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
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morning. I would like to talk very briefly on just two subjects.
One is antitrust and the other is strategic planning.
First, on the issue of antitrust, the head of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice' and the Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission2 appeared a couple of weeks ago
before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee. In response to
questions, the Justice Department official was reported as stating:2
The U.S. economy is in the midst of dramatic changes that
warrant close antitrust scrutiny. Increased globalization, rapid
technological innovation and deregulation are creating an
environment in which many firms are choosing to merge or
undertake other types of strategic business alliances. While most
of these arrangements foster efficiency, to the benefit of consumers
and businesses alike, some can result in market power that
decreases competition.'
Now, he could have been talking about the financial services
industry, couldn't he? From what we have heard from Chairman
Leach and the other panelists, we certainly have a situation where
there has been increased globalization that continues to this day.
In this morning's news, there was an account of a British bank
taking over a French bank, or trying to.' We have seen many
foreign firms enter the United States, and of course, the reverse is
true as well.
Technological innovation is highly apparent. One is inclined
to agree with the Counsel to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency. He recently stated that it is "rather ironic" that after so
90. Joel I. Klein. See generally David Segal, Joel Klein, Hanging Tough; Why
Justice's Antitrust Chief Is Taking Firms to Court, WASH. PosT, March 24, 1998,
at C1. [hereinafter Segal] (describing Klein's background).
91. Robert Pitofsky. See generally Sharon Walsh, Going to Bat for the
Trustbusters; FTC Chairman Pitofsky Wears a Moderate Mantle, but Is Ready to
Take on Agency Critics, WASH. PosT, April 13, 1995, at D12 (describing
Pitofsky's background).
92. See Statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice before the Antitrust, Business Rights and
Competition Subcommittee Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
Mar. 22,2000.
93. See id.
94. Andrew Garfield, HSBC Leads the Way into Euro Zone with 6.6BN
Pounds French Bank Takeover, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 3,2000.
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much time spent by the banking industry trying to get out from
under Glass-Steagall, the forces that seem to be determining which
financial services All be offered by banks and how they will be
packaged, seem to be driven by technological issues rather than by
regulatory ones. Furthermore, the regulatory situation is not what
could properly be described as deregulation, although it has some
elements of deregulation. It seems to be, from what we have heard
from the other panelists, that it is more accurate to call it re-
regulation - re-regulation that will take a number of years for its
exact content to settle down.
Now, what happens in the meantime? The head of the
Antitrust Division suggests that there may be substantial
mergers. ' Well, if that happens, people in the financial services
industries are generally well equipped to handle it. The process for
clearing mergers is pretty well known.7 Should there be problems
with a particular transaction, the government agencies, at least in
the relatively recent past, have found ways to be accommodating
by insisting upon certain divestitures that, if made, will enable
them to approve the transaction."
But I think we should focus a little bit on the possibility that
there may be other types of strategic business alliances undertaken.
95. Joel I. Klein, Head of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice; see also Segal, supra note 90.
96. See supra p. 54.
97. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,561 (1992). See
generally Nguyen & Watdns, supra note 33, at 533-534 (describing the
government's "step-by-step process by which they determine whether any
particular combination of firms will have anticompetitive consequences").
98. For example, the Department of Justice required Zions Bancorporation
and First Security Corporation to divest 68 bank branches in Utah and Idaho in
order to permit a merger between the two banks. See BanklWest WVill Acquire 68
Utah, Idaho Branches Divested in Zions-First Security Merger, PR NEVS\iIRE,
Jan. 18, 2000. The Department of Justice also approved a divestiture plan for the
sale of 285 bank branches, to allow for the merger of Fleet Financial Group and
BankBoston Corporation. See Fleet Successfully Completes the First of Three
Planned Divestitures to Sovereign Bank of New England, Bus. WiRE, Mar. 27,
2000. The mergers between Bell Atlantic and Vodafone AirTouch and Aerial
Communications and VoiceStream Wireless also required divestures of
overlapping cellular properties. See FCC Approves Bell Atlantic-Vodafone
Airtouch, WAsH. TELECOM NEWS~RE, Mar. 30,2000.
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Such alliances need not necessarily be governed by the same
antitrust regime as mergers. In fact, the government published for
comment last October a set of proposed guidelines on
collaboration among competitors falling short of mergers." These
collaborations, which may include arrangements, are referred to as
"strategic business alliances," and can be governed by an entirely
different regime. This regime, which in antitrust jargon is called
the "rule of reason,"'" provides either for clearance at one
extreme, or criminal prosecution at the other extreme, and quite a
lot in between. Therefore, if you are considering an arrangement
that is more in the nature of a strategic business alliance, it is a very
good idea to test it against the proposed guidelines. In some
situations it may be best to actually bring it to the attention of the
agencies.
Putting antitrust aside, I would like to turn very briefly to the
subject of strategic planning. I have had the good fortune to be
exposed to a fair number of strategic plans, largely because it is
usually the first thing a government antitrust investigator will ask
for - i.e., "Show me the strategic plan; then I can figure out what is
really going on in this industry and I will get it in the words of the
people who really know." The strategic plans I have seen adopt,
usually, a five-year time frame and are revised periodically during
the course of the plan. They include numbers - that is, predictions
of what the firm's revenues are going to be, what the firm's costs
will be, and, of course, what the likely profits will be.
Anyone who has met with strategic planners or has done
strategic planning, has probably had to deal with the frustrations of
personnel who say, "It is very difficult to know what my costs are
going to be over the next five years. It is just about impossible to
know what the revenues are going to be because that depends on
99. The Federal Trade Commission consulted with the Department of Justice
in drafting the "Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors."
See Diane Brady, When is Cozy too Cozy, Bus. WK., Oct. 25, 1999. The final
form of these guidelines was released April 7, 2000. See Comm Daily Notebook,
Comm. DAILY, Apr. 10, 2000.
100. The "rule of reason" essentially requires courts to conduct the antitrust
analysis. See Harry S. Davis and Todd S. Fishman, The Proposed Antitrust
Guidelines For Competitor Collaborations, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 1999 (Outside
Counsel) at 1.
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events beyond our control." Nonetheless, top management insists
on these plans. Why does management do it? Because their
responsibility is to allocate the resources of the firm in a way that
makes for the greatest profit. In order to do that they have to be
able to compare one planner's output with another planner's
output and reach a conclusion as to what is in the best long-term
interest of the company.
Now, top management may view these plans in the same way
that an orchestra conductor views opera stars. That is, very
difficult to live with but impossible to live without. But, at the
same time, there is absolutely no question that a good strategic
plan is essential to a firm's profitable operation in ordinary times.
Now, as we have just discussed,' ' these are far from ordinary times,
for technology is reshaping the product offerings and globalization
is expanding competitive markets. It is quite difficult, in fact, to
know who one's competitors are.
Now, what does this imply for a plan? First, it implies that the
plans have to be more expansive than they have been up until now.
Even with a company that might say, "our revenues today are 80
percent derived from businesses that we were not in five years ago"
there has to be some element of planning to bring that about. That
has to have been part of the scenario that was evaluated and
changed as the business developed.
But now it is, to say the least, more complicated. The planning
document has to allow for many more contingencies than before.
In addition, it must be recognized that the degree of uncertainty
introduces either an additional or greater element of risk in the
operation of the firm.
Well, what does one do in that kind of a situation? I would
suggest that one of the things that we see happening is that there
are more checkpoints as to whether the plan's assumptions and
conditions are still being satisfied. A second, and very important,
concept is the spreading of risk through diversification. One form
of such diversification is to engage in joint venture activity, such as
we discussed a moment ago.1' In order to let that joint venture
101. See supra p. 54-55.
102. See sources cited supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing
collaboration by competitors and potential guidelines to regulate such
2001)
58 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
activity produce true diversification, it is very important to include
in the joint venture document a provision for dissolving it.
When I was a younger lawyer, an old fellow told me the most
important provision in a joint venture document is the provision
for dissolving it. The clients will never like you when you insist on
putting it in because they will say that you are being negative
rather than constructive. But, time and again, it turns out that
those provisions are very, very important.
Finally, if you are prepared for the negative things that may
result from lack of adequate planning, it may be useful to go the
additional step and patent successful methods and models. Many
general lawyers are unaware of the fact that the patent laws now
permit the patenting of business methods in a number of
circumstances.'" I have seen a number of cases in which people
have gone on to derive substantial income from those business
method patents.
Thank you. I hope that allows us some time for discussion,
Carl, before we have our lunch.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: I think we have a few minutes
before we go into lunch, so let me throw it out to you folks. Does
anyone have any questions?
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
MR. SWEET: I will ask a question of Ernie Patrikis. Ernie
was talking about the future of insurance regulation.' I just note
that, I think in the 1970s, securities price regulation essentially was
thrown out the door, and then in the 1980s there was deregulation
of pricing in the banking industry." I think the insurance industry
is the last financial services firm with a form of pricing regulation,
which strikes me as being a bit of a handicap. Where do you
foresee that going?
MR. PATRIKIS: It is beginning to go. Some of the states
have begun deregulation on the general insurance side, but not on
collaboration).
103. For a discussion on the expansion of patent law to include business
methods, see generally, Charles R. McManis, Symposium, Re-Engineering Patent
Law: The Challenge of New Technologies, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2000).
104. See supra p. 28.
105. See Donald I. Baker, Searching for an Antitrust Beacon in the Bank
Merger Fog, ANTrrRUST BULL., Sept. 22,1992.
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the life insurance side. The issue in those cases is how far down
will the premium go. It is very interesting. One of the opposing
forces is the agents' cadre. With form and rate, they know the
form. With deregulation, the forms could be different because
they will be created for smaller customers. The agents don't want
to learn that the form says, "You know our life is wonderful
today." They have been one force.
Another issue is, at a time when premiums are already at
levels that I would say are too low, that deregulation of rates is
going to cause more competition, which will accelerate what I
believe will be the number of failures. That's not to say we should
stop it, but I think that is another reason why we are seeing
perhaps a ceiling on how far deregulation goes. On the life
insurance side, from a consumer interest perspective, I think it is
going to be some time before we really see deregulation.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Clyde Mitchell, who is also an
Adjunct Professor of banking law here at Fordham, did you have a
question?
MR. MITCHELL: I don't mean to be picking on Ernie
Patrilis, but this is also for Ernie. In banking we have the dual
banking system, state and federal."' It has been around for a long
time. In ten years what do you think the insurance regulatory
system will look like? Is there a chance that we would have every
insurance company with federal regulators setting out how
regulations get established, or will we have mixed state and federal
level regulations?
MR. PATRIKIS: I, at first, have wondered why there hasn't
been more of a shift, in banking, to the national bank charter for
those organizations that are branching across state lines. Why
subject yourself to two supervisors? What benefit is there to be
subject to a state banking department plus the Federal Reserve or
the FDIC? Consider the cost of all that regulation.
In insurance, I am hopeful that we will see a federal charter. I
106. The dual banking system allows banks to be chartered and regulated by
either the federal or state governments. See ABAIA's Proposal for Optional
Federal Chartering of Insurance, available at
httpVlwwvw.aba.comlABAALabaia.opdualcharterl.htm, (last visited Sept. 21,
2000).
2001]
60 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
hope it does not come about because of a downturn in the industry.
In the past, the general insurance business went through bad times.
The last time the issue of a federal charter came up, it was because
of a necessity to restructure the industry."7 I believe it is better for
the industry to work it out for itself.
What I see as the difficult issue is what will be the nature of
the federal charter. In banking there is one charter. A bank can
either be wholesale, retail or everything, as per its own choice. In
insurance, there are separate charters for life, property, casualty,
surety, etc.ls Will we have a single entity wherein the organizers
will have a choice of what businesses they want to conduct? Will
the charter be capable of allowing all types, or will it be narrower?
Which one will it be?
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC")Y'° is now fearful of the federal charter movement. " ' This
has prompted them, under Commissioner Nichols,' to support
dual regulation."' This is positive, for there is nothing like
107. The Dingell bill (H.R. 4900) was introduced by Rep. John Dingell, D-
Mich., then chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, to
address insurance insolvencies by creating a dual federal and state regulatory
system. See Paul Dykezicz, Solvency is State Issue, Industry Groups Say, J. COM.,
Apr. 23, 1992.
108. See e.g., Financial Services Modernization Act Hearing before the House
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106h Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of
John B. McCoy, President and Chief Executive Officer of Banc One Corp.)
(stating that "[Banc One officials] are confident that the proposals that Congress
has considered to mix banking and commerce could be safely and soundly
executed by this Nation's financial services and companies and commercial
firms").
109. See generally http://www.naic.org, (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
110. See State Implementation of the NARAB Subtitle in the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act: Hearing Before the Securities Subcommittee, Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs (Apr. 12, 2000) (statement of Terri Vaughan, Chair,
NAIC Financial Services Modernization Working Group on NARAB), available
at http:/www.naic.orglnews/testimonies/pdfs/4-12-OOtestimony.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21,2001).
111. George Nichols III, Commissioner of Insurers of Kentucky, member of
the 2001 NAIC Executive Committee, and former President of the NAIC. See
http://www.naic.org/lmisclaboutnaic.officers.htm, (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
112. But see Gene Linn, NAIC Wrestles with Regulations, J. COM., Mar. 1, 2001,
at 8.
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competition in regulation. It doesn't necessarily mean disregarding
safety and soundness, but prompting them. Will we see states now
pulling away from form and rate regulations?
New York State is a tough state. The New York State
Insurance Superintendent 3 believes itself to be - and it may well
be - the best insurance department in the country. They are not
going to readily accept what another insurance department does.
You can't buy a bank so simply. One can't buy a bank with an
alias, as one can with an insurance company, and we have had
some scandals."' The quality of state regulation in insurance varies
tremendously. Banking supervision in some states may be better
than in others. Those are all issues to grapple with.
New York State is never going to accept something like a
European Community view," where you allow an entity to come in
across borders. In the European Union there are no form and rate
regulations, but the host country, the country in which one is doing
business, is allowed to regulate for the common good. This means
consumer regulation.
Then, of course, there is the problem of cheating. The French
would say that any insurance contract that is not in French
obviously needs to be in French, in order to protect consumers. I
would like to do one more for the French. We saw a British bank
that wanted to acquire a French bank, but a French firm won. This
happens all the time in France. There is a major question of
whether there is de jure and de facto nationalist treatment. One
never knows when a French government official ill call up a
French firm and say, "We must not allow X from Y country to
acquire this organization. You must acquire it for the good of
France." That is a wicked issue.
In Germany we are also beginning to see that the German
firms have huge unrealized profits on securities that they have held
113. Neil D. Levin. See http:/Aiww.ins.state.ny.ushp97nLhtm, (last %isited
Apr. 1, 2000).
114. See e.g., Dennis Kelly, Caught Off Guard, BEST'S REV.Oct. 1, 2000, at
143; Pressure Builds For Federal Charters For Insurance, FED. & ST. INs. WI.,
Sep. 25,2000; New Book Examines Fugitive Financier Frankel, BEST's INs. NEwS,
Apr. 3,2001.
115. See Lisa S. Howard, Cross-Border Rules for EU Brokers Eyed, NAT'L
UNDERWmrER- PROP. & CASUALTY, Oct. 2,2000.
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since the Depression in 1929. They are going to be allowed to
divest those securities tax-free. There is going to be a huge amount
of funds rolling into the German banking and insurance systems.
Where are they going to want to make acquisitions? Right here in
the United States.
So the level playing field internationally is something to watch
out for. Regarding those firms that buy here, I have asked the
supervisors in the New York Insurance Department, "Did you ever
read the footnotes on a financial statement of a European
insurance company when you a do review of its acquisition?" The
answer was, "No." Well, no one does. Analysts do not read the
footnotes either. The true profitability and capital adequacy of
those foreign firms does not approach that of ours. This is going to
be a very interesting future, I think, in this area.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Larry Uhlick, may I follow
through on what I suggested earlier? Would you accept a question
as to whether in the first weeks of Gramm-Leach-Bliley" 6 the
foreign banks have fallen behind the domestic banks, and whether
there is resentment in your foreign bank membership as to their
status in the United States?
MR. UHLICK: At this stage, there is great concern that the
statutory pattern and its implementation may not work out as well
as people had anticipated months ago. Up to this point, it seemed
like a reasonable principle that the foreign banking organizations,
in order to become financial holding companies, need comparable
capital and management standards. But, there have been big
problems in terms of the Federal Reserve getting itself
comfortable, and letting through what people think are a
reasonable number of good institutions that should be approved.
Let me be more specific on that issue. The European
Community has made various diplomatic protests that the system is
lopsided and it is almost, in a way, as though the institutions
elsewhere in the world have been domesticated by the United
States."7  Obviously, these institutions are not going to be
116. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
117. See, e.g., PR NEWSWIRE, EU Envoy Urges Equal Treatment under New
US Banking Laws, March 6, 2000 (detailing the demands and concerns of
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comfortable with the United States as a host company regulator,
purporting to domesticate or micro-regulate the institution from
elsewhere in the world, when that institution is supposed to be
regulated globally by the home country regulator. So there is quite
a tiff going on amongst the regulators.
There will be ramifications for American financial institutions
if this doesn't get worked out. There has been a bananas' war' and
one would hate to see a banking war. It is in the cards, however,
because there is a huge imbalance between the way other
countries, as host regulators, are regulating U.S. institutions doing
business abroad, and the way the U.S. as a host regulator is seeking
to regulate non-American institutions from elsewhere in the world.
Personally, I think a little bit of fine judgment, as is always the
case, can work this thing out. The Federal Reserve is going to have
to treat these institutions with sensible judgment. It's almost like
the second child theory: with the first child, the bottle drops and
you get hysterical; with the second child, you pick the bottle up, put
it in the baby's mouth and everything is fine. The Federal Reserve
is going to have to deal with these institutions on a sensible
judgmental basis - letting in the good ones, and objecting when
they have a fundamental problem. Until that is done, the jury is
out. Until that is achieved, I really do think there wll be very
serious diplomatic protests and very serious practical ramifications
for American-based financial institutions.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Larry.
A question up here?
QUESTION: You have all been speaking about how the
legislation has followed the innovation in the industry, rather than
led it in terms of direction for change. I'm wondering if you think
there vll be even more innovation developed outside of the
financial holding company charter, before the industry segments
learn how to use that new charter to develop whatever it needs to
European bankers and regulators); see also Rob Garver, Fed Rebuts Foreign
Banks' Claim of New Rules' Bias, AM. BANKEIR April 19,2000, at 2.
118. See generally Steve Pearlstein, U.S., EU Hold Off on Imposing Trade
Sanctions, WASH. PosT, November 18, 2000, at El (discussing the dispute
between the United States and the European Union over the European Union's
ban on the importation of bananas from United States-based producers into
Europe).
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survive and prosper in the new economy?
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Would somebody other than
Ernie Patrikis care to pick that one up? Bill Sweet?
MR. SWEET: Looking at the flow of human capital, Heidi
Miller, the CFO of Citigroup, left to go to Priceline."'  An
executive, I learned today, from Sumitomo has gone over to Sony
to help them with their Internet bank. If one examines the flow of
human capital, I think it suggests that yes, in fact, innovation will
occur, at a minimum, at a much more rapid pace outside of the
financial holding companies than within them. The question then
is whether the financial holding companies can retain any of that
capital. One of the ways you do that is by making investments in
these companies and offering your employees an interest.
Secondly, you look at whether they will be able to make the
investments to participate indirectly.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: I would like to ask Bill Lifland
a question about antitrust enforcement. My question is, Bill,
really, where is antitrust enforcement? We have seen some mind-
boggling bank mergers over the last ten years in the United States.
I can't help but develop a substantial sense that the authorities,
whether they are the traditional antitrust authorities, i.e., the FTC,
the Attorney General's office, or the banking regulators, seem to
be almost primed in advance to let bank mergers go through
without obstacles, except perhaps here and there, you know,
"dispose of a half-a-dozen branches in Cincinnati and you will be
okay." Do we really have vigorous bank antitrust enforcement in
the United States and will we have it under Gramm-Leach-
Bliley?' 2
MR. LIFLAND: I think, Carl, that the answer to your
question would clearly be a "yes" if you left the word "bank" out.
We do have vigorous antitrust enforcement. The government
enforcers are fond of pointing out that in the past year they have
collected Sherman Act' fines that are many times more than what
119. See Patrick McGeehan, Web Concern Hires Officer of Citigroup, N.Y.
TIMBS, February 24, 2000, at C1.
120. Granun-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
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they had collected in the past." There was one $500 million fine" -
I didn't say $500, but $500 million - and there was at least one other
$100 million fine.' So the general tendency has been to increase
the level of enforcement and to maintain it at a high level.
Now, when you add the word "bank" back into the question,
then I think two points are raised. First, as Ernie Patrikis said
earlier, there are still an awful lot of banks in the country, and
some of the things that banks do can be done by other financial
service institutions. In general, then, one would not expect to find
the same level of antitrust activity in that area, were it not for the
fact that banking has traditionally been viewed as a local or
regional activity, rather than a national activity.
Second, given the techniques that the government applies in
analyzing mergers, and also that it is sometimes possible for these
institutions to make divestitures which eliminate the likelihood
that prices for bank services will increase as a result of the
transaction, you often tend to find that the agencies do not
proceed.
Frank Scifo, do you have a different view on that?
MR. SCIFO: No, I think that is quite right. I am sitting here
thinking about whether there will be any difference with respect to
the Act' and the shift in jurisdiction. But basically, when you look
at the industry, I think it's so fragmented that any procedural
difference between bank regulators and antitrust regulators outside
of banks is yet to be seen.
MR. PATRIIS: I see two separate issues. One is that there is
122. For a discussion on the increase in such fines, see the U.S. Department of
Justice Antitrust Division Annual Report FY 1999, Part H: The Criminal
Enforcement Program, available at http:Ilww.usdoj.govlatrpublic4523e.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2000).
123. See generally David Barboza, SiX Big Vitamin Makers Are Said to Agree
to Pay $1.1 Billion to Settle Pricing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIV.S, Sept. 8, 1999, at C2
(describing a settlement agreement by "sbc of the world's largest ,itamin makers"
to settle a class-action lawsuit concerning a conspiracy to fi. vitamins).
124. See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Arder Daniels Agrees to Big Fine for
Price Fixing, N.Y. Tams, Oct. 15, 1996, at Al (vaiting about Archer Daniel
Midland's $100 million fine for conspiring to fi the prices of two agricultural
products).
125. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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a 10 percent cap under the legislation that allowed interstate
banking."u No bank can make an acquisition if it has over 10
percent" of the deposits in the United States. I think Bank of
America is already at that point. No acquisition can be done in a
state, and this is federal law, if you are acquiring more than 10
percent of deposits held in the United States.'~
Now, a second issue is how do we measure this limitation. It is
pretty simplistic if we use deposits. So if a Chase and a Chemical
merge and they use deposits as an indicia of competition, where
are those deposits from? If I look at the deposits booked at Chase
in New York City, they can be from all over the world. These are
not necessarily consumer deposits. Where are the loans? What
are the sources of the loans?
What is not done in antitrust analysis in banking, because it
because combing through all the data and product lines, while
saying "Ah, yes", would be too expensive and difficult for the
Justice Department to do. The only area where this really comes
out in is within medium and small business loans, where the Justice
Department has carved out an exception, saying that loans to
medium and small sized businesses is a concern."' It is in these
cases that we have the divestitures.
That doesn't consider a bank like Wells Fargo, which is
located in California and that does mailings. Wells Fargo mails
throughout the United States and Canada, for loans to medium
and small sized businesses, which drives the Canadian banks crazy
because Wells Fargo doesn't have a branch in Canada. That is not
considered in an antitrust analysis. If we are to do a merger
analysis, a community in upstate New York that has small
126. See 12 U.S.C. 1831(u) (passed as part of the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), Sept. 29,1994).
127. According to Charles A. Gabriel, Jr., an analyst with Prudential
Securities in 1998, Bank of America had over 8% of the national deposit share as
of June 1998. See James P. Lucier, The Big Banks Get Together, INSIGHT ON THE
NEws, Jun. 1,1998.
12& See 12 U.S.C. 1831(u) (2000).
129. See Constance K. Robinson, Director of Operations, Antitrust Division,
Bank Mergers and Antitrust, Address Before the Association of the Bar in the
City of New York (Sept. 30, 1996), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclspeecheslrobins2.htm.
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businesses that Wells Fargo is making loans to, using credit scoring
(not even knowing who the owner of the company is), is
disregarded for regulation purposes.
So it is a difficult issue. Where does one get the data for doing
a real fine analysis?
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Maybe we need another
Philadelphia National Bank:' decision, as well as a return to "Go"
and a fresh start.
Last question, Larry Uhlick.
MR. UHLICK: I agree with Ernie's analysis that this is not
really a statute regulating financial holding companies. It is a
statute holding banks up to a broader authority and imposing
umbrella supervision on them.
But what would he give us instead? We are always looking
forward, not only analyzing this statute,,'1 but always looking at
where things are going. Would he be happy with a system where
any owner of a financial holding company would be subject to
umbrella supervision; or as they are in Europe? If an entity is
involved with securities and insurance, but not with banking, would
it be subject to some umbrella supervision? Right now it is all on
the banks. My question is, what is the new system?
MR. PATRIIUS: Oversight. Is there really a need to have
capital adequacy at the holding company level? I don't understand
it. Each of the firms is adequately supervised and regulated. We
have said as a matter of public policy that banks, broker-dealers,
investment managers and insurance companies will all be
supervised and regulated. An oversight policy would say, "Well, I
want to know relations with affiliates." There are laws in all of
these areas that govern transactions with affiliates, and in banking,
that means ten percent relationships, not twenty-five percent.
So I don't see the need for this "almost regulation" if the
Federal Reserve is not an oversight supervisor. If it really were
oversight - that is, understanding the entity, knowing the inter-
130. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (enjoining a
proposed bank merger as a violation of Section Seven of the Clayton Act, due to
the merger's deleterious effect on competition).
131. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L No. 106-102,
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relationships between the firms, having the ability to get
information at any time - that, to me, is a very doable, safe and
sound alternative. But putting in capital adequacy, or, in other
words, saying that this is just a big bank while all the corporate
separation is irrelevant and all the unsupervised and unregulated
activities are very relevant, is not the solution in my opinion.
Let's say a swap activity occurs with an unsupervised,
unregulated swap subsidiary with a triple-A rating. That triple-A
rating is the best regulator, not a process of sending in some
supervisor or regulator to possibly find something. I don't see that.
We do our foreign exchange trading in a foreign exchange
subsidiary that is unsupervised and unregulated. It's the eleventh
or twelfth largest foreign exchange trading subsidiary in the world.
It's triple-A rated. That's the regulator. It's the concern about the
marketplace and that rating that should govern.
The Fed should understand the relationships. But to set
capital adequacy standards on it - must everything be regulated?
You see, I start with the premise that everything need not be
regulated. If something takes place in the wholesale market, or
concerns wholesale counter-parties, then there is no need for
regulation.
I don't like the system that we have in place today where the
SEC goes after Bankers Trust for what it did with Procter &
Gamble. There's no need for it because you can't deal with an
agency. There is no de facto due process. If the SEC or the
Federal Reserve comes after you, the issue is, "How much do I pay
to get out of this picture?" It is not, "Did I do something wrong?"
Any firm with integrity will not challenge the Fed or the SEC. You
cannot do it.
So I say the only way to deal with this topic is to deregulate
entirely. This legislation does not deregulate, nor does it re-
regulate; it is a new layer of regulation. Does that make the world
a safer place? I'm skeptical.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Please join with me in
thanking our panelists for being here and giving us their thoughts.
MR. OLIVERIUS: I also want to thank Professor Felsenfeld
for doing an excellent job moderating this panel.
